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This paper examines how ex-combatants of El Salvador’s 1980-1992 civil war 
view post-war processes of reconciliation. I demonstrate that contrary to dominant 
understandings of ongoing political polarization in El Salvador, perpetuated by 
Salvadoran political parties, many former army and guerrilla combatants are coexisting in 
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Peace Accords and the apparent political polarization has opened a space for the 
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this process “grassroots peacemaking,” emphasizing the everyday negotiations of 
remembering and creating new social relations in a nation torn apart by war and violence. 
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1. Introduction 
Reconciliation would be if these combatants were friends before the war, then during war became 
enemies, and in post-war times became friends once again.  
Diego Lopez, San Salvador July 2010.1  
  
In 2004, I traveled to Brazil to visit a friend. A former guerrilla combatant of El 
Salvador’s Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), he was attending a non-
violent communication training. To my surprise, he was taking part in the conference 
alongside a former captain of the Salvadoran army’s Atlacatl Battalion. My initial 
reaction to witnessing these former enemies attending the training together and living 
under the same roof at their home was one of unease. The Salvadoran state and FMLN 
forces fought a civil war from 1980-1992, leaving over 75,000 dead, 500,000 internally 
displaced, and thousands in exile (Thompson: 1997; United Nations: 1992). The army, 
and in particular the Atlacatl Battalion, was notorious for committing horrendous 
atrocities, including the December 1981 El Mozote massacre. This history made the 
seemingly impossible friendship between these two ex-combatants difficult to digest.   
 In trying to come to terms with what I was witnessing, I asked my friend, “How 
did you become friends with a member of the army?” He responded,   
There are no saints in war. Most guerrillas fought because the army was bloodthirsty from the 
beginning to the end. How will a son forget that his mother was killed after being raped by a 
soldier? [But also,] how would the wife of a soldier forgive a guerrilla for killing her husband in 
front of her? Yet many people on both sides lacked understanding and political formation in the 
ideologies they supposedly defended (Author’s notes, Brazil, July 2004).   
The Salvadoran civil war divided the country, and countless families, into two camps. 
Individuals either supported the state and its forces, or the guerrilla movement. However, 
to publicly acknowledge one’s support for either side often meant risking one’s life. 
Disappearances, assassinations, torture and forced displacement were part of a hideous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  will	  use	  pseudonyms	  throughout	  this	  paper	  to	  protect	  informants’	  identities.	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index of everyday violence in El Salvador. Of the more than 20,000 complaints filed with 
the U.N.-backed Salvadoran Truth Commission (STC) after the war, “over 60% were 
extrajudicial executions, more than 25% were forced disappearances, and more than 20% 
included the denunciation of torture. Of the total number of denunciations, approximately 
60% were against the armed forces, 25% were against the security forces, 20% were 
assigned to the civil defense, 10% to members of death-squads, and 5% to the FMLN.” 
(STC: 1993). 2 
This violence provoked a silent socio-political polarization. And the combatants 
themselves, who were both defenders and symbols of the ideals they fought for, publicly 
represented this division. Many members of the army, despite coming from a working 
class background, self-identified as supporters of the state, the existing economic order, 
and capitalist ideals. In contrast guerrilla combatants and their sympathizers who 
identified with the poor, the working class, and socialist ideals.3 This socio-political 
polarization became common sense in Salvadoran society, and thus made my experience 
of witnessing former enemy combatants coming together in a meaningful friendship 
counterintuitive.4  
Still perplexed by this experience, I returned to my home country as a graduate 
student in the summer of 2010 to conduct preliminary research on local practices of 
reconciliation among ex-combatants. As a native Salvadoran who grew up in El Salvador 
during the Civil War, an immigrant to the United States, an activist in the U.S.-based El 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  I	  should	  note	  that	  El	  Salvador	  (21,040	  km²)	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  size	  of	  Massachusetts	  or	  Wales.	  	  3	  I	  should	  also	  point	  out	  that	  the	  geopolitical	  conflict	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Russia	  to	  control	  the	  Central	  American	  region	  and	  their	  ideological	  discourses	  permeated	  and	  obscured	  issues	  that	  generated	  the	  internal	  conflict.	  4	  I	  understand	  common	  sense	  as	  the	  experiences	  that	  has	  shaped	  the	  thinking	  of	  a	  group	  of	  people	  in	  society.	  This	  becomes	  a	  shared	  understadings	  that	  creates	  a	  set	  of	  norms	  which	  individuals	  internalize	  as	  social	  rules	  from	  which	  to	  draw	  for	  the	  way	  they	  act	  or	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  world.	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Salvador solidarity movement, and most recently a graduate student at a “gringo” 
university, I was positioned as both an insider and an outsider. Within the landscape of 
the Salvadoran political left, my background as a social justice activist and native of 
Soyapango – a densely populated, working class neighborhood, just outside the capital 
city of San Salvador – positioned me as an insider and lent me trustworthiness and 
credibility. At the same time, living and studying in the U.S. positioned me as an outsider 
who did not have direct experience of the current socio-economic disparities, and who 
had only an outside observer’s understanding of the country’s current political dynamics. 
Yet it is my experience growing up during wartime and later witnessing former enemy 
combatants come together in the post-war era, despite ongoing political polarization, that 
has shaped my political leanings and research interests. As an activist researcher 
committed to social justice, I identify with grassroots efforts for the recreation of 
Salvadoran social networks and civil society in the post-war era.  
I consider my work with former combatants who fought on opposite sides of El 
Salvador’s armed conflict to be “activist research,” as it overlaps with this approach. 
Activist research, according to Charles R. Hale (2007), is a methodology that combines 
rigorous scholarship with politically engaged work, in alignment with an organized 
collective group. This research,   
“a) helps us better to understand the root causes of inequality, oppression, violence and related 
conditions of human suffering; b) is carried out, at each phase from conception through 
dissemination, in direct cooperation with an organized collective of people who themselves are 
subject to these conditions; c) is used, together with the people in question, to formulate strategies 
for transforming these conditions and to achieve the power necessary to make these strategies 
effective” (Hale: 2001:13).  
 
While I concur with Hale’s broad definition of activist research and its methodology, in 
this particular research my work is not necessarily at the service of “an organized 
collective of people.”  The ex-combatants whose practices I have studied are often at 
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odds with the institutions and organizations they are affiliated with. And frequently, 
victim-survivors of human rights violations and people at the extremes of El Salvador’s 
highly polarized political establishment condemn ex-combatants’ efforts to coexist and 
forge common ground. In light of the hostile reactions that they have engendered, these 
coexistence practices raise the following questions: How can we, as Salvadorans, address 
our recent history in a way that enables us to create a peaceful and democratic present? 
And, what would it take to re-humanize society?  
 My attempt to explore these questions is based on my observations over the last 6 
years and a series of 20 interviews I conducted in the summer of 2010. The open-ended 
question format I utilized was geared towards gathering information about the extent that 
reconciliation has been taking place in El Salvador, particularly among former enemy 
combatants. In addition, and as necessary, I followed an informal interview format 
(conversations) to respect individuals’ requests not to be recorded on paper or audio 
taped. While I had assumed most people would feel comfortable addressing the topic, my 
preliminary research showed that many ex-combatants refused to label their coexistence 
practices as “reconciliation.”  
 In one of my interviews, a former guerrilla combatant stated, “At first, guerrilla 
and army combatants did not talk to one another, assuming the interactions would result 
in a confrontation. Then, lack of healthcare for veterans pushed us beyond fears, and to 
work together to call on the state for help” (Authors’ notes, July 2010). However, when I 
identified these practices as reconciliación (reconciliation) – a term that most transitional 
justice scholarship would use to understand these practices – ex-combatants refused the 
term as a description of their relationships with their former enemies. This insight caused 
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me to question my own understanding of the term and its meaning in the post-war 
Salvadoran context. It also led to a reexamination of the state-led reconciliation process, 
and, at the same time, encouraged me to analyze and document ex-combatants’ localized, 
grassroots efforts for peaceful coexistence in Salvadoran society.  
 Based on my preliminary research findings, I argue that the attitudes of those I 
interviewed toward the word “reconciliation” is not directed at the concept of 
reconciliation, per se, but rather reflects a critique of the state’s understanding of the term 
and its actions toward that end. Yet, rather than focusing on the state’s understanding of 
reconciliation and its practices, I take as my subject of analysis ex-combatants’ 
perspectives on the events that have led to what I refer to as “the paradox of 
reconciliation.” First, I provide a summary of the process that created the state-led 
reconciliation process, its premises, and applications. In this section, I juxtapose the 
official, top-down approach to reconciliation – driven by international and national 
political actors – with the grassroots coexistence practices carried out by ex-combatants 
themselves.  Through this analysis, I explain how the state-led reconciliation project has, 
paradoxically, given rise to a parallel, grassroots peacemaking process. 
 The second section begins with a brief overview of El Salvador’s mainstream 
political parties, which serves as a means of examining how the popular discourse of 
socio-political polarization has contributed to the development of alternatives to the state-
led reconciliation process. My analysis here emphasizes how the role of the two leading 
parties’ ideologies in promoting polarization has increasingly diminished. 
 Finally, I explore the ways that ex-combatants and their relatives understand 
reconciliation, demonstrating their critiques of the state’s understandings and practices. 
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Ex-combatants’ rejection of state-led reconciliation and their resistance to political 
polarization brings to light their agency not only in resisting top-down projects, but also 
in creating an alternative approach for the reconstruction of the social networks in their 
communities. I suggest that grassroots peacemaking efforts dismiss the state’s 
understanding of reconciliation, with its emphasis on “forgiving and forgetting,” to 
instead highlight the concepts of justice, remembering, coexistence, and community.   
 My paper explores ex-combatants’ approaches to postwar reconciliation, which in 
this essay I will call “grassroots peacemaking,” and focuses on the following questions:5 
First, what are the Salvadoran state’s understandings and practices of reconciliation? 
Then, in what ways has the leading political parties’ discourse of polarization hindered or 
supported grassroots peacemaking efforts? Finally, how is reconciliation understood 
outside of state apparatuses, and in what ways is this understanding leading to the 
construction of an alternative to the state-led reconciliation process? These questions take 
on particular importance in helping me address the overarching question of why ex-
combatants engaged in reconciliatory practices refuse to label their efforts as 
reconciliation.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This	  is	  due	  to	  combatants’	  refusal	  to	  the	  term.	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2. Historical Background 
 In 1992, the government of El Salvador and the Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla organization signed Peace Accords that ended twelve 
years of armed conflict. The roots of this conflict reside in the country’s socio-economic 
disparities, which go back to the late 1800s, and the political repression exercised by a 
string of military dictatorships that ruled the country from the 1930s. With the rise of 
industrialization in Western Europe and the United States in the 1800s, El Salvador 
became part of the global economy by producing cash crops such as coffee. The wealth 
generated from this market was harnessed by the approximately two percent of the 
population that owned coffee plantations. In time, they became the oligarchy of the 
country, owned about 60% of the productive land, and exercised direct or indirect control 
over most key productive sectors of the country’s economy. This gave rise to a class-
based social formation and military apparatus that generated tensions between the newly 
constituted oligarchy and the masses of indigenous people and peasants. 
 The oligarchy, with ties to the ruling political class and with the support of the 
military, enforced numerous laws directed at enhancing the production of coffee on their 
behalf. On one hand, the state sanctioned the elimination of ejidos (communal land 
holdings), and on the other imposed anti-vagrancy laws to ensure sufficient labor for the 
privately owned plantations. As a result, tensions between classes grew. The oligarchy, in 
alliance with the military, supported the 1931 military coup against the first 
democratically elected President of El Salvador, Arturo Araujo.6 This coup started the 
history of military dictatorship in the country. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  I	  should	  point	  out	  that	  this	  characterization	  remains	  contested	  in	  El	  Salvador.	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 As a result of military repression and the disruption of indigenous means of 
subsistence living, Augusto Farabundo Martí, an indigenous leader, led a peasants’ 
uprising against the military government in 1932. The state responded with a wave of 
repression that resulted in the massacre popularly known as la Matanza (the Massacre). 
Over 32,000 indigenous and peasants were assassinated, many by death squad groups that 
killed anyone who looked like an indigenous person, or who was suspected of supporting 
the uprising.  
 After this event, the military, in alliance with the country’s economic elite, 
consolidated its control over the state. Indigenous and peasant resistance considerably 
decreased, even as the social inequalities that spurred the uprising continued to worsen. 
In addition to an elite that benefited from the class-based divisions, there was also 
military repression, lack of jobs in the cities, and lack of access to education and health 
care. 
In response to this situation, the late 1960s witnessed a revival of the popular 
social movement. This time, teachers, students, factory workers, and peasants formed a 
broad-based movement mobilizing against the military dictatorship. As the confrontation 
grew on the national level, there was a parallel struggle within the army in late 1970s, and 
in 1979 a group of officers overthrew the military junta that was in power at the time in 
an attempt to stave off civil war. However, the new military leadership was unable or 
unwilling to enact reforms that addressed the root causes of the mounting conflict, and in 
1980 war began in earnest.  
The Salvadoran armed conflict was firmly rooted, both historically and 
ideologically, in the midst of the Cold War. The ideological discourse of capitalism 
9	  	  
versus communism that dominated the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet 
Union also came to reductively frame El Salvador’s internal conflict. Roberto 
D’Aubuisson, a Salvadoran military officer who gained notoriety as a leader of quasi-
clandestine “death squads” that operated during the war, founded the ARENA party in 
1981, promising to defeat the communists. From its formation, the party represented the 
country’s military and economic elite, and aligned itself with conservative members in 
the U.S. government. During the war it sought state power through elections while at the 
same time supporting state repression against the social movement. 
Though the FMLN’s recognition as an official political party did not take place 
until the signing of the 1992 Peace Accords, it was founded in 1980 as a military-political 
umbrella organization for five armed groups: Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), People's 
Revolutionary Army (ERP), National Resistance (RN), Communist Party Armed Forces 
of Liberation (FAL), and the Central American Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRTC). 
These organizations had each formed to counter the state repression apparatus (police, 
armed forces, and death squads) employed by El Salvador’s military junta government in 
the late 1970s.7  United as the FMLN, they demanded that the military junta be replaced 
with a civilian government. They also called for land reform, the redistribution of capital, 
more jobs, and access to education and healthcare.  
The war persisted throughout the 1980s, perpetuated in part by U.S. military aid 
of $1.5 million per day to the Salvadoran government. By 1989, the FMLN had become a 
sophisticated guerrilla army that had fought the Salvadoran military to a stalemate. 
ARENA, on the other hand, had won state power through that year’s presidential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  “Fuerzas	  Populares	  de	  Liberación	  (FPL),	  Ejército	  Revolucionario	  del	  Pueblo	  (ERN),	  Partido	  Revolucionario	  de	  los	  Trabajadores	  	  (PRTC),	  Resistencia	  Nacional	  (RN),	  Fuerzas	  Armadas	  de	  Liberación	  (FAL)”	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election. Recognizing that neither party was likely to defeat the other militarily, the two 
sides entered into peace negotiations that lasted for three years. On January 16th, 1992, 
the signing of the Peace Accords between the government of El Salvador and FMLN put 
an end to twelve years of civil war. 
 To help with the transition from conflict to peace, the peace accords included 
measures such as land reform and a restructuring of the judicial and electoral systems. 
The FMLN was demilitarized in a U.N.-certified process, and the military and police 
were dramatically reorganized, and, the FMLN became an official political party.  At the 
same time, the negotiators of the accords recognized that two key steps towards peace 
were the reunification of Salvadoran families and the generation of trust in the newly 
created or reformed state institutions (United Nations: 1992). Toward these ends, a U.N.-
backed Truth Commission was created for the investigation of human rights violations 
committed during the war, which was viewed by the state and victim-survivors of 
violence as a step toward achieving national reconciliation and procedural justice. 
However, as time passed it became evident that the work of the commission, combined 
with two laws granting amnesty to those accused of war crimes, was the extent of the 
state’s reconciliation effort.   
The legacy of the Peace Accords, and particularly its reconciliation elements, has 
evolved into something of a mixed blessing. On one hand, the government and FMLN 
were able to put an end to twelves years of armed struggle and created structural 
transformation within the state apparatus. On the other hand, the peace agreements 
limited the means for dealing with human rights violations and effecting reconciliation to 
the Truth Commission’s quasi-legal mandate. Even this limited potential for procedural 
11	  	  
justice and “reconciliation” was short lived, as the amnesty laws made it impossible to 
achieve any form of procedural justice.8 
While I can only speculate as to what could have been an alternative approach to 
the reconciliation process, I know that the state’s process has been a source of 
disillusionment for many Salvadorans, including perpetrators and victims-survivors of 
war violence, who associate the official reconciliation process with state power and a 
political elite (Silberina: 2011: 02). This disillusionment and lack of socio-economic 
reforms for reducing the gap between rich and poor, in turn, are the dynamic forces 
behind the grassroots peacemaking processes in El Salvador.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  I	  should	  notice	  that	  the	  removal	  of	  Amnesty	  Laws	  to	  open	  the	  space	  for	  procedural	  justice	  is	  a	  contentious	  debate	  in	  El	  Salvador	  across	  social	  strata.	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3. Theoretical implications 
 My work is situated within literatures of social memory and transitional justice, 
but moves beyond the dominant paradigms of the latter by studying ex-combatants’ 
understandings of their own grassroots peacemaking processes. Transitional justice 
scholarship highlights the connections among reconciliation, peace, and democracy as 
keys to ensuring socio-political stability and security in post-conflict societies. Many 
social theorists argue in favor of war crimes tribunals as functional instruments to 
promote universal standards of justice and respect for human rights, and in turn to deter 
future violations and persuade individuals to comply with these norms. Conversely, other 
social theorists argue that truth and reconciliation commissions are a better approach for 
transitional justice. They argue that the political goal of ensuring a transition out of 
conflict should not be compromised by a legal process that further divides society. While 
both arguments provide insights for transitioning a society out of conflict, they both 
assume individuals will share with the state a common understanding of reconciliation 
and agree with the state-led process to attain it.  
 This assumption has been critically examined by another group of social 
scientists. They argue that, while reconciliation and other transitional justice efforts 
intend to support the reunification of society and address human rights violations, in 
practice these efforts have shown to be based on inherently unequal power dynamics 
between the state, civil society institutions, and individuals engaged in the process. 
According to Richard Wilson and Shannon Speed, state-led reconciliation processes and 
their human rights discourse are best understood as top-down efforts to incorporate 
individuals into a state project (Wilson 2001; Speed 2008). These projects take place 
13	  	  
within the framework and rules of newly formed state bureaucracies, and at the behest of 
individuals and sectors behind state power (Wilson 2001:19). Individuals’ participation in 
these processes occurs through strictly regulated moments in which victim-survivors 
submit complaints and provide testimonies to Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. At 
the same time, perpetrators confess participation in atrocities in exchange for pardon and 
amnesty. Reconciliation is often considered achieved when amnesty laws are passed and 
commission reports are published (Sieder et al: 1998:181). The state’s involvement often 
ends with these final efforts for dealing with past human rights violations and attaining 
procedural justice, even when individuals remain critical of the state’s process. (Shaw, 
Waldorf, Hazan et al: 2010; Popkin: Theidon: 2004:190,193; 2000:x; Sieder et al: 
1998:251)  
 In light of this critique, other social scientists have argued that reconciliation is 
something lived and practiced at the community level, and thus the concept of 
reconciliation needs to be studied and understood at the local level (Theidon 2004; Shaw, 
Waldorf, Hazan et al: 2010; Silberina: 2011:186).  Theidon writes,  
“If we are interested in recuperating people and communities, it is necessary to understand how 
these concepts [reconciliation] are defined and how the relationship between them and a particular 
culture is conceptualized…[Because] what is at stake in postwar contexts is the reconstruction of 
the social networks, of the cultural forms and economic networks, and the re-invention of life 
rituals that allows a community to make sense of the suffering experienced and produced” 
(Translation mine; Theidon, 2004: 44,89).9 
 
Such analysis brings to light the ways in which people practice reconciliation and process 
their physical and psychological wounds in their everyday lives. These practices often 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	   “Si	  nos	   interesa	   recuperar	  personas	  y	   comunidades,	   es	  necesario	  entender	   como	  estos	   conceptos	  (reconciliación)	  son	  definidos	  y	  como	  la	  relación	  entre	  ellos	  se	  conceptualiza	  en	  una	  cultura	  dada...Lo	  que	  esta	  en	  juego	  en	  los	  contextos	  de	  posguerra	  es	  la	  reconstrucción	  de	  las	  relaciones	  sociales,	  de	  las	  formas	  culturales	  y	  de	  las	  redes	  económicas,	  y	   la	  reinvención	  de	  la	  vida	  ritual	  que	  le	  permite	  a	  una	  comunidad	  dar	  sentido	  al	  sufrimiento	  experimentado	  y	  causado.”	  	  	  	  
14	  	  
depart from states’ understanding of “reconciliation” and its implementation projects. 
The state tends not only to overlook the power dynamics involved with its participation – 
a top-down reconciliation process – but also obscures the power dynamics and social 
stratification that caused the conflict in the first place. 
 Much of this critique is salutary, as it examines the local rituals allowing for 
coexistence practices, and the ways in which reconciliation is lived and practiced at the 
local level. Yet in their efforts to focus our attention on the local, Theidon (2004) and 
Shaw, Waldorf, Hazan, et al (2010) ultimately rely on the assumption that the concept of 
reconciliation is widely and unquestioningly accepted. While it is certainly true that local 
practices of coexistence need to be understood from a localized standpoint, it is also the 
case that questioning the acceptance of the reconciliation term opens a fruitful window of 
analysis. This provides an understanding of the recreation of social networks that goes 
beyond a state-led understanding of reconciliation.  
 I suggest that expanding the analytical lens beyond the official conceptualization 
of reconciliation and its notions of “forgiving and forgetting” will provide a nuanced, 
critical understanding of social formation in post-conflict communities. Without this 
understanding, social scientists risk missing why individuals who were perpetrators or 
victim-survivors of war violence might not view efforts to forgive and forget as positive 
for themselves and their communities. Without understanding how individuals and 
communities negotiate a delicate balance between remembering and constructing a new 
community outside official understandings of reconciliation and its programs, social 
scientists might end up re-inscribing similar power disparities between local communities 
and the state.  
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 Many Salvadorans engaged in coexistence practices, including ex-combatants, are 
not aware they are participating in what is known as “reconciliation.” Instead, they have 
formed friendships and worked together due to material needs. Thus, when asked about 
the reconciliation topic, a common answer given by many Salvadorans is, “neither 
reconciliation, nor forgetting, now I simply can [live with my pain]” (Author’s notes).10 
In sum, the process I call “grassroots peacemaking” takes place without an agenda, a 
method, or a political goal. And yet in refusing to label their actions as “reconciliation,” 
and by contesting the state-led reconciliation process, the limits of the reconciliation 
concept are questioned.  
 My hope is that this research will contribute to an anthropology of politics and 
violence and interdisciplinary scholarship on transitional justice in relation to democracy, 
peace, justice, and collective memory. By understanding ex-combatants’ grassroots 
peacemaking in a specific context, my work draws out the nuances of lived experiences 
in a postwar situation, and ultimately questions the viability and usefulness of external 
concepts such as “reconciliation” for successful and productive post-conflict 
relationships. More importantly, my work examines how social relations in a postwar 
society are formed, and suggests that questioning what has become the common sense of 
“reconciliation” will sharpen social scientists analytical gaze.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  “Ni	  reconciliación,	  ni	  olvido,	  hoy	  simplemente	  puedo	  soportarlo”	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4. Peace Accords and the State’s Reconciliation Process  
 As the 1992 Salvadoran Peace Accords were rapidly implemented at the close of 
the war, and the Truth Commission investigated a number of symbolic human rights 
violations, the international community and institutions such as the United Nations 
regarded the Salvadoran peace process as one of the most successful in the world. 
Addressing the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador in March 1999, then-U.S. President 
Bill Clinton said, “[N]o nation has traveled a greater distance to overcome deeper wounds 
in [as] short [a] time [as] El Salvador” (Clinton: 2000: 336). In June 2010, U.S. 
Congressman James P. McGovern  reiterated this position, stating “El Salvador is a 
reconciled nation” (Author’s notes).11   
 At the national level, the state and key leaders from right and left parties have also 
appraised the peace agreements as a “success” (Prensa Grafica: 2007).  However, for 
rank-and-file former combatants, the agreements fell short creating structural changes 
that facilitated the reunification of Salvadoran society.  
When asked to talk about the agreements, Jose Torres, a former FMLN leader and 
combatant in his late 40’s, addressed the past with a certain nostalgia, and yet with 
poignant critiques of the process. As Torres described the transition from conflict to 
peace from a combatant’s point of view, he stated, “When the peace accords were signed, 
all combatants… had to conduct a new grand operation: reinsertion [into civilian life].”12 
Torres continued: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  As	  part	  of	  my	  research	  for	  the	  project,	  I	  conducted	  an	  internship	  with	  Rep.	  McGovern.	  	  As	  I	  was	  particularly	  interested	  in	  understanding	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  El	  Salvador	  from	  someone	  with	  close	  tides	  to	  the	  country	  as	  Rep.	  McGovern,	  who	  had	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  the	  U.S.	  congressional	  investigation	  that	  created	  the	  Joe	  Moakley	  Commission	  report.	  The	  report	  tied	  then	  Jesuit	  military	  subjects	  to	  the	  assassination	  of	  seven	  Jesuit	  priests	  and	  recommended	  to	  cut	  military	  aid	  to	  the	  Salvadoran	  army,	  which	  in	  turn	  contributed	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  El	  Salvador.	  	  12	  “Todos	  los	  combatientes…nos	  topamos	  con	  una	  nueva	  gran	  operación	  que	  realizar:	  reinsertarnos.”	  	  
17	  	  
Many compas [comrades] created cooperatives… some of us received the order to enrol at the 
PNC [National Police Academy], a scholarship to study, a course in a specific profession, and 
others were simply pushed aside. And then cada quien vea como le hace (everyone for him- or 
herself) became a slogan… It would be interesting to do a study to locate the…compas and find 
out what has become of them today. I am almost sure that it will result in something like 
neoliberalism applied on a small scale. A few are doing well. Others, the majority, are as they 
were before the war, and even worse because we now carry the phantoms of the war with us uphill 
(Translation mine; online transaction: 2008).13 
 
This statement raises the following question: For ex-combatants, what were the material 
gains from the signing of the peace agreements? In answering, Torres wrote on his blog: 
The only tangible gain from the [peace] accords for the combatants and the [masses] is that the 
guns were silenced… the army stayed in the quarters and we could say with pride that we were 
from the frente [FMLN]. That was it. The gain for us is that we were not killed and that we now 
can write without problems. From this perspective the peace agreements were a success 
(Translation mine; online transaction: 2008).14 
 
Jose Torres went on to comment that another gain has been in the area of governability 
and democracy. However, for him this is “a theory, a question for the state, something 
that the majority of us compas understand very little, and the little we understand we see 
as [reversion]” (Online transaction: 2008).15 His words seem to reflect a deeply ingrained 
critique among rank-and-file former combatants, many of whom are highly disillusioned 
by the lack of support shown to them by the leadership of the FMLN party and the state.   
 When talking about the peace agreement with Roberto Diaz, a former army 
captain, he stated, “The combatants need health care, a way to make a living. Especially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	   “Muchos	   compas	   se	  organizaron	  en	   cooperativas…otros	   recibimos	   la	  orden	  de	   ir	   a	   la	  PNC,	  otros	  recibimos	  alguna	  beca	  para	  estudiar,	   otros	   recibimos	   cursillos	  de	  alguna	  profesión	  y	  otros…fueron	  simplemente	   apartados.	   Y	   el	   cada	   quien	   vea	   como	   le	   hace,	   se	   convirtió	   en	   consigna…Seria	   curioso	  hacer	  un	  estudio	  para	  ubicar	  donde	  están	  los	  compas	  (	   los	  de	  verdad)	  y	  que	  es	  de	  ellos	  ahora.	  Casi	  estoy	  seguro	  que	  resultaría	  algo	  así	  como	  el	  neoliberalismo	  aplicado	  en	  chiquito.	  A	  unos	  cuantos	  les	  ha	  ido	  bien,	  otros	  ,	  los	  muchos	  están	  como	  antes	  de	  la	  guerra,	  y	  si	  cabe	  mas	  jodidos	  porque	  cargamos	  con	  los	  fantasmas	  de	  la	  guerra	  a	  cuestas.”	  14	   “La	  única	  ganancia	   tangible	  para	   los	  combatientes	  y	   las	   “masitas”	  es	  que	  con	   los	  acuerdos	  ya	   los	  fusiles	  se	  silenciaron…el	  ejercito	  ya	  se	  quedó	  en	  los	  cuarteles	  y	  nosotros	  podíamos	  decir	  con	  orgullo	  que	  éramos	  del	  frente.	  Hasta	  ahí.	  La	  ganancia	  para	  nosotros	  es	  que	  no	  nos	  mataron	  y	  que	  podemos	  escribir	  sin	  problema	  alguno.	  Desde	  esa	  perspectiva	  los	  acuerdos	  de	  paz	  fueron	  un	  éxito.”	  	  15	  “una	  cuestión	  de	  teoría	  de	  estado,	  algo	  que	  la	  mayoría	  de	  compas	  poco	  entendemos	  y	  los	  que	  poco	  entendemos	  vemos	  como	  involución.”	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those with disabilities, who deal not only with the ghosts of war, but with their physical 
impediments.” After a pause, he added, “El Salvador es un hospital en desorden” (El 
Salvador is a messy hospital). Diaz’s metaphor provides a strong image of the chaos and 
suffering still experienced not only by former combatants, but also by Salvadoran society 
in general. For him, healing and an organized grassroots peacemaking is a process yet to 
come.  
The topic of “reconciliation” seemed to peripherally emerge in my conversations, 
but was not directly addressed. I asked Torres to share what reconciliation meant for him. 
The following is an excerpt from his answer, posted on a blog:  
Regarding reconciliation: there was gato por liebre [trickery]. The truth commission only showed 
us a showcase truth… it was impossible to do anything, amnesty laws were in the middle… 
[During the war] there was indiscriminate violence, the social wounds have not healed yet, they 
are there. [They] might be at a rest, but latent. There is no such thing as borrón y cuenta nueva [to 
erase the past and create a new future on a blank slate]. Nobody believes in that. There has not 
been reconciliation, because we have been extremely occupied with reintegration (into society). 
Or, better said, we have been extremely occupied in surviving, like everyone else. This has not 
allowed us to participate in a reconciliation [process] under academicians’ standards (Online 
transaction: 2008).16 
 
These statements raise the questions, does an academic understanding of the 
reconciliation concept share similar assumptions to that of the state? If the answer is yes, 
how can social scientists move beyond the state’s understandings, and avoid reinscribing 
similar power dynamics that exist between the state and communities?  
 In 1992-1993, the Salvadoran Truth Commission played a key role in easing the 
transition into peace. Similar to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the 
Salvadoran Commission was created as the main vehicle for dealing with atrocities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  “Sobre	  la	  Reconciliación:	  Es	  que	  ahí	  hubo	  gato	  por	  liebre.	  La	  comisión	  de	  la	  verdad,	  solo	  nos	  mostró	  una	   verdad	   en	   vitrina:...No	   se	   podía	   hacer	   nada,	   leyes	   de	   amnistía	   de	   por	  medio…hubo	   represión	  indiscriminada	  todo	  eso	  está	  ahí.	  Quizás	  quieto,	  pero	  latente.	  No	  hay	  tales	  de	  borrón	  y	  cuenta	  nueva.	  Nadie	   cree	   en	   eso.	   Reconciliación	   no	   ha	   habido,	   porque	   hemos	   estado	   demasiado	   ocupados	   en	   la	  reinserción.	  O	  más	  bien	  hemos	  estado	  ocupados	  en	  sobrevivir,	  como	  todos	  los	  demás.	  Eso	  no	  nos	  ha	  permitido	  entrarle	  a	  la	  reconciliación	  bajo	  los	  estándares	  de	  los	  académicos.”	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committed during the war and for bringing about reconciliation in the country. As stated 
in the peace agreements, the Government of El Salvador and FMLN created the 
commission “reaffirming [their] intention to contribute to the reconciliation of 
Salvadoran society” (United Nations: 1992). This process was to be accomplished 
through “the task of investigating serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 
and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the truth” 
(United Nations: 1992). A main goal of the commission was then to act as a catalyst for 
closure to the individual and social wounds created by state repression and war violence. 
Paradoxically, the granting of amnesty to those accused of human rights violations was 
viewed by the Salvadoran government at the time as a primary form of national 
reconciliation.17  
 In contrast to the South African experience, in which the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission investigated and engaged in symbolic procedural justice for many years, the 
Salvadoran Truth Commission (SCT) was limited by a mandate to investigate for only six 
months, after which it was to publicly reveal the names of perpetrators of human rights 
violations and suggest a mechanism for punishing those who were found guilty of 
atrocities (SCT: 1993). Despite the limited scope of the SCT’s powers, the process 
generated hope for justice among the victims of human rights violations and their 
families. However, this transitional justice effort was thwarted both before and after its 
inception.  
 Before the creation of the SCT, on January 23rd, 1992, the National Assembly of 
El Salvador – composed of deputies from the pre-peace agreement political parties – 
approved a National Reconciliation Law that granted amnesty to various government 	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forces and FMLN members. Yet because this law did not protect everyone, on March 22, 
1993, just a few days after the SCT published its findings, the newly elected assembly 
passed an even further-reaching amnesty law. This law made it illegal to prosecute 
anyone who had committed an atrocity during the course of the war (Amnesty Law: 
1993). This law remains the state’s primary expression and practice of the concept of 
reconciliation.  
 Despite the lack of further concrete actions, the state promoted a reconciliation 
discourse in which El Salvador was portrayed as a nation that had left behind its violent 
past to construct a new peaceful future. Yet this discourse did not represent most 
individuals’ understandings of the principle of “reconciliation,” including former 
combatants. This imbalance resulted in the articulation of localized, grassroots 
peacemaking processes based on ex-combatants coexistence experiences. These 
processes include the organic negotiation of spaces for working together, living in the 
same communities, and even forming meaningful relationships with people who may 
have caused harm to them or their families. In a country in which job opportunities are 
few and levels of poverty are high, for many, including ex-combatants, the only resource 
left is the support of community networks.  
 In an interview with a husband and wife who are both ex-guerrilleros, the 
husband told me:  
When we moved to this town, we never mentioned we were frente people. This town, Cinquera, 
was known for being an army stronghold during the war. But after the war, we came to live here. 
With a couple zinc rooftops and other materials, we built a place for our children and us to sleep. 
That winter we got wet. The roof did not protect us from the heavy rains. One day the neighbor 
came with a couple pieces of zinc roof for us. Then, another day, he came with wood. Little by 
little we started to talk. Not surprisingly, he was a former army combatant. Yet the surprise has 
come many years later, despite having fought against one another during the war, and us being 
frente people, we continue to be friends, helping each other in what we can (Translation mine: 
Author’s interview, June 2010).  
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I was surprised to find numerous stories similar to this one, in which material needs 
outweigh past ideological divisions among former combatants. And yet this should not 
come as such a revelation, as a former guerrilla combatant Valeria points out,  
“Both soldiers and guerrillas once were[/are] poor peasants, workers, students. Coming from the 
same social background, same village, barrio, sometimes (and quite, quite often, same family). As 
the war ended there are evident…commonalities amongst us all” (Electronic Communication with 
Author: April 2011).  
 
This kind of grassroots, organic peacemaking is especially powerful given the political 
polarization that continues to permeate Salvadoran society, and the efforts of political 
parties to further this division by drawing on war rhetoric while obscuring this reality, 
especially during electoral campaigns.  
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5. Political Parties and the Socio-political Polarization 
After the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992, the Nationalist Republican 
Alliance (ARENA) and Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) became El 
Salvador’s two main political parties, and positioned themselves at opposite ends of the 
political spectrum. Despite the two organizations’ emergence as advocates of opposing 
interests at the start of the postwar era, their leaders’ diplomatic experience in negotiating 
the end of the armed conflict was seen as a promising foundation for El Salvador’s 
nascent democracy. The Peace Accords demonstrated that individuals representing 
opposing, entrenched ideological beliefs and interests could come together to reach 
agreements for the benefit of the country and its people. For many Salvadorans, the end 
of the war brought about the promise that the terrain for the negotiation and resolution of 
social, ideological, economic, and cultural conflicts would now be political, rather than 
military. In turn, it was assumed that belligerent wartime discourses would lose their 
acrimony, allowing Salvadoran society to heal the wounds left by twelve years of armed 
conflict. 
However, this was a short-lived hope. As time passed, the ARENA and FMLN 
parties increasingly fell back on their tried-and-true discourses, capitalizing on the 
country’s collective memory of war for their own political gain. Meanwhile, both parties 
blatantly embraced the state-led reconciliation process as a standard campaign trope. This 
approach for practicing politics has promoted a Salvadoran political culture that views the 
rival party and its members as enemies. In addition to alienating many Salvadorans from 
party politics, this polarization has paradoxically also created a space for the grassroots 
peacemaking process now under way in El Salvador.  
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 During the war, ARENA’s ideological discourse and economic policies provided 
the party with fruitful support from the military and upper class sectors of society. 
However, after twenty years of controlling both the executive and legislative branches of 
the Salvadoran government, ARENA’s failure to reduce social disparities caused 
Salvadorans from various social strata to question the party’s political-economic program 
for the country. In the post-war era, ARENA has advocated and implemented neoliberal 
economic policies such as the adoption of the U.S. dollar as El Salvador’s currency and 
the implementation of a multi-lateral free trade agreement with the U.S., the Dominican 
Republic, and four other Central American countries (DR-CAFTA).  
Meanwhile, the FMLN’s ideological discourse, history of struggle against state 
repression, and proposals for the construction of a socialist society bestowed the party 
with wide support from poor, middle, and some upper-middle sectors of society. 
However, in the postwar era, many Salvadorans have questioned the party’s lack of a 
concrete economic and political plan to achieve the promise of a new society. Since 
becoming a political party, the FMLN has readily opposed ARENA’s neoliberal 
economic policies. Yet since the FMLN, in a coalition with current President Mauricio 
Funes, gained state power for the first time in 2009, the administration has continued with 
neoliberal policies. At the same time, they are implementing educational and healthcare 
programs directed at increasing access to these government services. 18 
As a considerable number of Salvadorans grew disenchanted with the 
performance of the two main political parties, both ARENA and the FMLN feared it 
would translate into electoral support for its rival. As a result, these parties found it more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  It	  should	  be	  noticed	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  contention	  about	  who	  is	  ruling	  the	  country.	  	  The	  FMLN	  doesn’t	  view	  this	  government	  as	  theirs.	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profitable to polarize the electorate by drawing on old ideological discourses than to 
debate their economic, social, and political platforms for the nation – platforms that had 
in some ways started to resemble one another with the passage of time. The parties’ 
ideological discourses and polarizing actions were viewed as devises to gain political 
support and access to state power, while at the same time obscuring the similitude of their 
political programs for the nation (Artiga et al: 2007).  
The best example of this took place in the lead up to the March 2004 presidential 
elections. In 2004, The Washington Times reported that “during the campaign, leftist 
[FMLN candidate] Schafik Handal…has sung a revolutionary song from the 1970’s, 
while followers of his right-wing rival, Elias Antonio Saca, have thrust fists into the air 
shouting, ‘Communism, No!”(The Washington Times: March 17, 2004) That same year, 
The Washington Times reported on how ARENA had utilized its connections to U.S. 
officials to generate fear of the FMLN. “Mr. Saca [ARENA’s candidate for the 
presidency] says an FMLN administration can’t guarantee good relations with the United 
States and would jeopardize the work visas of the Salvadorans who live there.” In support 
of ARENA’s campaign, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega travelled to El 
Salvador just days before the election and was quoted as saying that Salvadorans 
considering voting for the FMLN should think about “what kind of relationship a new 
government could have with us” (TWT: March 17, 2004). 
 The FMLN responded with actions that aimed to further polarize the political 
system and society. According to Dada, in the period of the mid-2000s, the FMLN 
reacted by “publically aligning themselves and creating closer ties with the Venezuelan 
government and proudly announced its fidelity with Cuba” (Artiga et al: 28-29). At the 
25	  	  
same time, the use of words such as “revolution” and “socialism” became heavily used to 
describe and differentiate the FMLN’s governmental program from ARENA’s platform.  
In examining the two main parties’ electoral politics and actions against one 
another, Rubén Zamora, a long-time Salvadoran politician and academic argues, “As the 
parties’ political programs become more similar, emphasis on the rhetoric is what they 
have left to gain electoral support.” (Artiga et al: 2007: 97) To exemplify this, Zamora 
juxtaposes text from the parties’ platforms leading up to the 2004 presidential election:  
“The FMLN proposal, without renouncing socialism as an end goal, has adjusted its programmatic 
proposal to fit the framework of a capitalist and democratic society... (It) explicitly establishes as 
its vision that of a ‘rich country, a productive and prosperous society, duly informed, culturally 
advanced, socially just and in solidarity, free of the dehumanizing inequalities and territorial 
disequilibrium (urban-rural) that affect (the country) today; a democratic society, with freedom of 
religion, free of delinquency and safe, highly organized, integrationist, promoting a sustainable 
environment, directed for the well being of the people and the realization of the human being. A 
society founded in the self-determination of its people.’”  
 
ARENA’s program seems to address similar issues. Zamora quotes: 
“Within the renovated vision of the historical project of ARENA, the administration of 2004-2009 
will have as its referential framework the following aspirations: To convert El Salvador into a 
modern society, rooted in knowledge, with high human capital, integrated socially and 
territorially, with general access to information, significantly oriented to reduce poverty and 
attainment of the common good; In the economic realm: to construct an inclusive and humane 
system, sustained by solidarity, businesses’ social responsibility and state subsidiaries that 
generate necessary revenue in the individual and social scope. In the political realm: to transform 
our country in a tolerant and cohesive, participatory, free society, that aspires to high levels of 
democracy and governability based on a complete application of the Constitutional Law, in 
permanent search for social peace.”    
 
Even while the parties’ focused on hiding the similarities in their programs under 
ideological discourses, their actions have resulted in political polarization. The paradox is 
that this political polarization has not been between former guerrilla and army 
combatants, or among different sectors of the Salvadoran society. The polarization has 
been between the political parties themselves, and between the parties and the majority of 
Salvadoran citizens (Artiga: 2007: Dada: 2005). 
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The polarization between individuals came to light in my interviews. After being 
introduced as a U.S.-based student to a potential subject, a former army general, I started 
the conversation by introducing my research topic and mentioning my interest in the role 
collective memory plays in the reconciliation process. As soon as the general heard my 
last words, he looked towards his friend, the captain who had facilitated the meeting, and 
with suspicious eyes said, “Did you hear? Collective memory? Are you sure about this 
interview?” With his question and emphasis on the word collective, the general 
positioned me on the left of the socio-political spectrum, and thus hesitated to do the 
interview. Yet his friend emphatically replied to the general, “Yes my general, it is okay. 
She already interviewed Raul Gomez and me.” After this reply, the general quickly 
consented to the interview. Yet most of his answers to my research questions included 
long monologues about the classics (i.e. Plato) and stories about the origins of the war 
from army’s point of view, rather than his opinion on the topic at hand. 
Similarly, individuals from the left received me with a mix of welcome and 
distrust. In a conversation with an acquaintance, a former rank-and-file guerrilla 
combatant, I mentioned my visit was to conduct research on the topic of reconciliation. 
As soon as he heard this, his demeanor changed from warm to reprimanding as he 
interrogated me, “Why is a compañera (leftist sympathizer) with political education 
conducting research on reconciliation?” For him, the reconciliation topic belonged to 
U.S. and right wing Salvadoran governments; in other words, “our enemies.”  
International organizations and the U.S. supported the Salvadoran reconciliation process’ 
focus on “forgiving and forgetting,” rather than dealing with the social and economic 
disparities that led to the armed conflict in the first place. 
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In a conversation with Roberto Diaz, an army captain, and Ruben Villareal, a 
former rank-and-file army combatant, I commented how the conversation with the 
general had gone. Villareal replied, “That is not rare. The people at the top usually think 
people would do them harm. They have their own (political) interests. During the civil 
war, many of us believed guerrillas, our fellow Salvadorans, were the enemy. Then, after 
the war, we learned the armed conflict was for the most part fueled by and for the benefit 
of the Cold War parties in conjunction with a small group of Salvadorans.” Entering the 
conversation, Roberto Diaz stated, “What happens is that political parties continue to 
practice a political culture that views tactics such as social polarization, defamation, and 
political violence as a way to do electoral politics. Many friends, who are army and ex-
guerrilla combatants and civilians, don’t believe in (political parties or their supporters) 
anymore. Their discourses have not resolved our basic needs. Our well-being and that of 
our families, we have learned, depends on us and many times on the help of those same 
people who were our former enemies” (Author’s notes, July 2010). The topic of 
reconciliation, from a military conservative point of view, was for the most part 
welcomed. This was true as long as the person conducting the interview was not viewed 
as being part of the political left.  
These interviews allowed me to understand that the polarization between the 
FMLN and ARENA has primarily served to increase the rancor between the parties’ most 
fervent supporters, their militantes. For most of them, communication with those from the 
opposing party is viewed as unacceptable. These “militants” are encouraged by their 
parties’ rhetoric to viewing the “Other” as someone who will cause them harm. These 
electoral strategies have normalized war attitudes such as distrust, prejudice, and the view 
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of the “Other” as the enemy. However, many Salvadorans feel alienated by these 
discourses and attitudes. This frustration has, in turn, given rise to a grassroots 
peacemaking process based on people’s own understanding and practices of what it 
means to coexist among “intimate enemies” in a highly stratified country (Theidon: 
2004). 
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6. Reconciliation vs. Grassroots Peacemaking 
 As my understanding of the term “reconciliation” seemed to describe the organic 
grassroots peacemaking happening in El Salvador, I had assumed that the term was 
widely accepted. However, after weeks of conversations with ex-combatants engaged in 
coexistence practices, I realized that our conversations had a circling dynamic that 
avoided mentioning the word reconciliation.  
 For instance, in one of my initial interviews with Diego Lopez and Rafael 
Dominguez, two ex-guerrilla combatants who are friends with ex-army combatants, I 
asked them to what extent reconciliation was taking place among former combatants. 
They paused for a second, made a gesture as if they were about to address the topic, and 
then instead of doing so diverted the conversation to another topic. They narrated war 
stories, debated national politics, and gossiped about leaders of the mainstream political 
parties. But conversations about reconciliation were kept to a minimum. After several 
such conversations, I decided to ask some of my closest informants why people avoided 
mentioning the word “reconciliation.”  
 In a conversation with Roberto Diaz, a former captain of the Atlacatl Battalion 
(and friend of Diego Lopez, an ex-captain urban guerrilla), I asked him to comment on 
what reconciliation means for him.  Energetically, as if he had been thinking about the 
topic for a long time, Diaz replied, “For me, reconciliation is, first of all, to recognize and 
accept within oneself the atrocities committed… I am a different person after the war.” 
Then, he continued, family reunification needs to happen. At the same time, there should 
be a “resolution with your former enemy, accepting that you were both the perpetrator 
and the victim of the violence committed.” In addition, ex-combatants must find “ways to 
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coexist with victims of war violence.” “But” Diaz concluded, “this is not happening in El 
Salvador.”  
 As at first Roberto Diaz’s comment seemed contradictory, I asked, “What about 
your friendship with Diego Lopez? Is that reconciliation?” Diaz began to answer with a 
similar beaming enthusiasm. “My friendship with el chero (a nickname for Diego Lopez) 
is an individual expression of reconciliation.” And, in the process of answering, his face 
lost some cheerfulness as he stated, “Reconciliation does not exist as long as socio-
economic polarization continues to take place in the country.” For these ex-combatants, 
the term reconciliation obscures the power dynamics between the state and sectors of 
civil society, between various local communities, and between individuals in those 
communities. The state-led reconciliation assumes that “reconciliation” needs to take 
place between victim-survivors and perpetrators, and between ex-combatants who fought 
on opposite sides. Yet the social disparities that led to civil war continue to be in place.   
 As I further explored this concept at a local comedor (cafeteria-style restaurant) 
over dinner with Diego Lopez, Lourdes Maria (a former urban guerrilla combatant), and 
Rodrigo (a civilian who lost his mother to state repression), I told them about Roberto 
Diaz’s previous answer to my question about reconciliation. Lopez sturdily replied, 
“Reconciliation doesn’t exist. Having former army and guerrilla combatants sitting 
together is not reconciliation. Reconciliation would be if these combatants were friends 
before the war, then during war became enemies, and in post-war times became friends 
once again. There needs to be a rupture and repair [in order for a relationship to be 
understood as reconciliation]. Thus, what I have with Roberto is another thing; a newly 
formed, caring friendship.” Entering the conversation, Lourdes Maria states, “Some of us 
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work with former enemy combatants, and we have learned to have cordial relationships, 
but I would not call it reconciliation, either.”  
 Similarly, the discomfort with the term reconciliation and the relationship 
between former combatants and the broader civil society was revealed at the home of 
Catalina, a mother whose daughter was “disappeared” by the Salvadoran army. My 
informant, Diego Lopez, had invited me to visit Catalina’s home. After the customary 
greetings, followed by a serving of coffee and bread, Lopez announced, “She is studying 
reconciliation in the country. Do you think it exists?” Immediately, Catalina responded, 
“Of course not. How can I have reconciliation with those assassins (the soldiers)? They 
killed my daughter.” Her other daughter, also in the room, replied, “But the guerrillas 
also killed many people, and probably the relatives of those people feel the same way you 
do, but toward the guerrillas. I am not ashamed to say it: I am friends with ARENA 
people now.” The conversation about reconciliation evoked candid, vibrant, angry 
feelings. People who have lost loved ones due to assassinations or disappearances, 
reconciliation, as understood by the Salvadoran state, means to forgive and forget. This is 
a step many citizens such as Catalina are not willing to take without legal punishment for 
the perpetrators of crimes committed during the war.   
 As I discovered, the term “reconciliation” did not come from Salvadorans on the 
ground, and ex-combatants and members of their communities do not use it to describe 
their efforts to reconstruct the social networks and civil society of the country. I found out 
that ex-combatants most often use the term convivencia (coexistence). In an unplanned 
conversation with a friend at the University of El Salvador, I asked Diana Orellana, a 
former guerrilla, “What does reconciliation mean to you?” Uncomfortable silence 
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followed my question. Orellana looked at me, lowered her reading glasses, and gave me 
an intense look, a look that could have meant, “Did the gringos send you to do this 
research?” Instead, she burst into laughter, and with a big smile told me a story. “The 
other day, I was at a presentation in the law school building when a group of students and 
faculty started to talk about the war. I got drawn into the conversation and started 
narrating my experiences as a former FMLN member. A friend pinched my arm, and took 
me aside to tell me ‘Do not talk so explicitly about your involvement. You never know 
who can be listening.’ We don’t have reconciliation. What we have is convivencia 
(coexistence).” For Orellana, convivencia with people from a different political view is 
experienced not as reconciliation but as negotiation of spaces in light of concrete needs 
such as being able to work and generate an income.  
 These ethnographic moments paint the state’s official “reconciliation” as a top-
down process that negates individual and community desires for justice and an inclusive 
social memory of the armed conflict. On the contrary, a reconstruction of the country’s 
social networks and civil society from the bottom-up, as understood by those who were 
themselves the perpetrators and victims of war violence, holds a potential to enlighten the 
creation of a peaceful and democratic society. These organic grassroots peacemaking 
efforts demonstrate that there is a lack of popular identification with the reconciliation 
concept. Moreover, for many ex-combatants and people who lost loved ones, the notions 
embodied in the term reconciliation do not form part of their sentiments and approach to 
everyday life. As a result, an alternative understanding of reconciliation, which I call 
grassroots peacemaking in the post-war era, has emerged. This is based on the need to 
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recreate ex-combatants’ social networks in society and live among ex-enemies in a 
densely populated country that continues to be polarized by socio-political conflict.    
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7. Conclusion 
 In El Salvador, reconciliation is a contentious term. Yet the puzzling revelation is 
that no one seemed to agree with the state’s understanding and practices of reconciliation. 
The state-led reconciliation consists of the implementation of two amnesty laws and the 
creation of a Salvadoran Truth Commission (STC), with its limited scope of power. 
While at the beginning the STC was viewed as an effort to usher in truth and justice, in 
the end it only facilitated the legitimization of the peace agreements and the newly 
formed state bureaucracy. The amnesty law, approved just a few days after the 
publication of the STC’s findings, closed what little space there had been for attaining 
symbolic justice. Thus, the contentiousness is not a critique of the term itself, per se, but 
rather a refutation of the state’s understanding of the term. 
Ex-combatants’ engagements in coexistence are in fact organic community and 
individual efforts to come to terms with the actuality that before political ideologies they 
share the same social background. While for the most part, scholarship on transitional 
justice would refer to ex-combatants’ coexistence practices as “reconciliation,” they 
themselves refuse the term as it is representative of the state’s and the people behind state 
power type of reconciliation, “forgive” and “forget.” Paradoxically, this refusal creates a 
space for what I call “grassroots peacemaking” in everyday life that include negotiations 
about what ex-combatants have done in the past, who they are now, and why and how 
they create communities. I suggest that “remembering” and “creating” communities have 
become part of a contestation against the common sense of: 1) the state’s reconciliation 
and its practices; and 2) the socio-political polarization based on ideological discourses 
serving the interests of political parties. For many Salvadorans, including ex-combatants 
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there cannot be “reconciliation” with those individuals behind economic-political power 
that maintain and further social disparities. 
As there are various examples of “grassroots peacemaking” taking place in El 
Salvador, many times led by former combatants, the political parties and their members 
could support these efforts by focusing their attention on the abysmal social disparities 
affecting Salvadoran society. Furthermore, many Salvadorans, including ex-combatants 
would have to create, develop and implement programs that facilitate the construction of 
a social memory with justice at its forefront. As a measure of redress for their 
involvement in the war, the international community, and in particular the government of 
the United States, has the responsibly to economically support these programs without 
directing them. I contend that such initiatives, if carried out simultaneously, will have a 
positive impact on strengthening the social networks of society and nascent democracy in 
the country.  
To this end, ex-combatants who participate in grassroots peacemaking, and who 
have received psychological support, are a potential resource for the maintenance of 
peace. As survivors of the conflict, with the experience of war violence, their testimonies 
would contribute to the construction of a collective memory of the recent past. At the 
same time, as individuals who fought and perpetrated violence during the war, in post-
war years many of them are among the most fervent advocates against state and social 
violence. The grassroots peacemaking processes that they are part of have a potential to 
plant the seeds for a much-needed social healing that will ensure peace in El Salvador. 
At the theoretical level, I believe that expanding what is the common sense of 
“reconciliation” will provide a nuanced interpretation of social formations. This includes 
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making sense of why and how seemingly contradictory practices such as “not forgiving” 
and “remembering” become key elements for recreating social networks and in creating a 
new community in post-war societies. Moving beyond the general notions of 
“reconciliation” will help prevent social scientists from replicating power dynamics 
similar to those between the state and the community. These localized efforts to coexist 
and move forward as a community, although seemingly contradictory, reveal the 
potential of expanding the analytical lens for understanding social formation in post-war 
societies.  
 
37	  	  
8. Bibliography  
 
Artiga, Alvaro, Dada, Carlos, Escobar Galindo, David, Martinez, Hugo, et al. (2007) 
La Polarización política en El Salvador. FUNDAUNGO and FLACSO-El Salvador. 
San Salvador Ricaldone Press.  
  
Booth, William. (2009: March 9) In El Salvador Vote, Big Opportunity for Leftists. 
The Washington Post. Accessed on April 17, 2011: LexisNexis Academic.  
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. (2008. The Outline of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. Twenty-third printing.  
 
Caravantes Valencia, Daniel. (2010, January 16) Funes pide perdón por abusos 
durante la guerra. ElFaro.net. Accessed on April 16, 2011: 
http://www.elfaro.net/es/201001/noticias/932 
 
Cárdenas, Leonor;  Solórzano, Claudia, (2010, March 24) El Presidente Funes pide 
perdón por magnicidio de Monseñor Romero. Diario Co Latino. Accessed on April 
17, 2011. http://www.diariocolatino.com/es/20100324/portada/78200 
Clinton, Bill. (2000). Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. 
Clinton, 1999, Book 1, January 1 to June 30, 1999. National Archives and Records 
Administration, Office of the Federal Register Press. P.336 
 
Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador. (1993). De la locura a la esperanza : la 
guerra de 12 años en El Salvador. Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad para El 
Salvador. San Salvador; New York: NN. UU. Press.  
 
Connerton, Paul. (1989). How Societies Remember. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Hale, Charles.  (2007) In Praise of ‘Reckless Minds’ Making a Case for Activist 
Anthropology. Anthropology Put to Work. Berg: New York. P.105 
 
Hale, Charles R. (2001) “What Is Activist Research.” Social Science Research Council: Items and 
Issues. Vol. 2. No. 1-2  
 
Hale, Charles. (1994) Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the 
Nicaraguan State, 1894-1987. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
 
Prensa Grafica. (2007). El Dialogo El Gran Protagonista de la Celebración. Enero 13.  
 
Popkin, Margaret. (2000) Peace without justice: obstacles to building the rule of law 
in El Salvador. Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
 
38	  	  
Rabinow, P. Ed. (1984). The Foucault Reader. New York, Random House Books.  
 
Shaw, Rosalind, Waldorf, Lars, and Hazan, Pierre. Ed. (2010). Localizing transitional 
justice: interventions and priorities after mass violence. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Sieder, Rachel. Ed. (1998). Guatemala after the peace accords. London: Institute of 
Latin American Studies Press. London: Institute of Latin American Studies. 
 
Silber, Irina Carlota. (2011). Everyday revolutionaries: gender, violence, and 
disillusionment in postwar El Salvador. New Brunswick Press. 
 
Speed, Shannon. (2008). Rights in Rebellion: Indigenous Struggles & Human Rights 
in Chiapas. Stanford California. Stanford University Press.  
 
Theidon, Kimberly. (2009). Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia. Human 
Rights Quarterly 31, 1-34. Johns Hopkins University Press.  
 
Theidon, Kimberly. (2007). Gender in Transition: Common Sense, Women, and War. 
Journal of Human Rights, 6:453-478. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group Press.  
 
Theidon, Kimberly. (2004). Entre prójimos: el conflicto armado y la política de 
reconciliación en el Perú. Lima IEP: Estudios de la sociedad rural 24. 
 
Thompson, Martha. (1997) Transition in El Salvador: a multi-layered process. Development in 
Practice. Oxfam GB. Volume 7. No 4. Special Double Issue. P.456-463. 
 
United Nations. (1992). El Salvador Peace Agreements: The Path To Peace. 
Document prepared by United Nation Observer Mission in EL Salvador (ONUSAL). 
 
Villalobos, Joaquín. (1999). Sin Vencedores, Ni Vencidos. Pacificación y 
Reconciliación en El Salvador. Primera Edición en San Salvador. Impresión 
Industrial Grafica Vanguardia, S.A. de C.V.  
 
Wilson, Richard. (2001). The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 
Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
(1992). Ley de Reconciliación Nacional de El Salvador. Decreto Legislativo No. 147 
publicado en Diario Oficial No. 14, Tomo 314, 23 de enero de 1992. 
 
(1993) Ley de Amnistía General para la Consolidación de la Paz. Asamblea 
Legislativa. Decreto No.:486. Diario Oficial No.: 56 Tomo No.: 318 
 
 Online transaction. (2008). A los Oídos de Elisa: Breves Apuntes Sobre la 
Reconciliación.  Republica de las Bermudas. Electronically accessed: March 25, 
2011.   
39	  	  
 
9. VITA 
 
Ruth Elizabeth Velásquez Estrada was born in San Salvador, El Salvador on December 
3rd, 1980.  After moving to the United States, she received a Bachelors of Arts in Cultural 
Studies from The Evergreen State College in the spring of 2004. Velásquez worked with 
Centralia School district until leaving the state in 2007. She became Program Director for 
Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador in Washington D.C. She entered 
graduate school at the University of Texas at Austin in August of 2009.  
 
 
 
Permanent address:     4533 Avenue H Apt C 
      Austin, TX 78751 
 
This thesis was typed by the author.  
